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INTRODUCTION
The importance of EU rules to maintaining open 
borders within Ireland has been at the centre of UK 
and EU negotiations. Yet what is less appreciated 
is the significance of those rules for achieving 
frictionless trade between England, Scotland and 
Wales. In the words of the House of Lords EU 
Committee, ‘The European Union has been…part of 
the glue holding the United Kingdom together since 
1997… In practice, the UK internal market has been 
upheld by the rules of the EU internal market.’1
1  House of Lords European Union Committee 4th Report 
of Session 2017–19 HL Paper 9 Brexit: devolution: https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/9/9.pdf 
As well as the possibility of new border trade barriers 
inside the UK, leaving the EU also opens up questions 
about how – and whether – the devolved nations will 
unite with England on external trade agreements.2 
In particular, a US trade negotiation poses a serious 
threat to the unity of the United Kingdom. 
2  UKTPO Briefing Paper 37 ‘ Brexit food safety legislation and potential 
implications for UK trade: The devil in the details’:  http://blogs.sussex.
ac.uk/uktpo/files/2019/10/UKTPO-Briefing-Paper-37.pdf
KEY POINTS
• A UK-US trade agreement would likely require changes to UK domestic legislation in very sensitive areas, 
including drug pricing and food safety regulation, which Scotland, with its large Remain-voting majority 
and stated desire to maintain alignment with EU regulation, would strenuously oppose.
• Leaving the EU creates a legal and policy vacuum regarding the relationship between devolved nations, 
and the extent to which they can influence UK trade negotiations. 
• By not taking Scotland’s interests sufficiently into consideration, the UK risks fuelling the Scottish 
independence movement and/or introducing internal trade barriers between England, Wales and Scotland 
(Northern Ireland will be subject to separate arrangements anyway).
• The UK Government may be forced to choose between facilitating trade with the US or holding on to the 
UK’s fragile national identity. The destruction of the UK internal market – and potentially the Union itself 
– seems too high a price to pay for a US Free Trade Agreement.
• Devolved nations should have a formal role in the setting of UK negotiating objectives, to ensure, among 
other things, that external trade agreements do not lead to internal trade barriers.
• The most straightforward path for the UK is, as far as possible, to replicate the EU’s balance between 
devolution and harmonisation with respect to UK-specific rules and bodies.
• The UK Government could also introduce increased legislative assurances that it will not weaken current 
levels of protection.
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However, these so-called ‘devolution settlements’4 
do require the devolved administrations to legislate 
in a way that is compatible with EU law. The EU also 
maintains the cohesion of its Single Market through 
centralised control or ‘exclusive competence’ over 
trade negotiations – though subject to an EU-level 
democratically-accountable process. 5 Member States 
only exert individual controls – through, for example, 
national parliaments voting to accept or reject 
international treaties – on a narrow range of topics.6  
Reclaiming UK control over trade agreements is 
a celebrated element of the rationale for Brexit, 
but Brexit will also provoke new questions: to 
what extent will these newly reclaimed powers be 
extended to devolved nations, and in which particular 
devolved areas? And: what happens if the nations 
disagree? That question is not merely theoretical. 
The US negotiating objectives include changes in UK 
agriculture and environment regulation – a devolved 
area – in which Scotland proposes to maintain full 
alignment with the EU.7  
WHAT WILL REPLACE THE EU AND 
ALLOW FOR A UK ‘SINGLE MARKET’?  
The short answer is, nobody knows. In preparation 
for Brexit, the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, the signature 
legislation designed to avoid a legal vacuum when 
the UK leaves the EU, establishes a new power for 
UK Ministers post-Brexit to redefine the powers of the 
devolved administrations.8 This controversial provision 
allows the UK Government to legislate for the UK as 
a whole in areas previously devolved, subject to the 
consent of the devolved nations and certain time 
limits. 
Clearly, this threatens devolved powers, but it is 
unclear whether the UK Government will ever invoke 
its new powers. Indeed, in practice, post-Brexit 
secondary legislation seems to be going in the 
opposite direction by allocating powers previously 
exercised at the EU level to the UK’s devolved 
4  The devolution settlements distinguish between ‘reserved’ 
and ‘devolved’ powers with the presumption that the devolved 
administrations may legislate on matters not reserved. The Scotland 
Act 1998; the Government of Wales Act 1998; the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998.
5  European Commission, Negotiating EU trade agreements. Who 
does what and how we reach a final deal: https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149616.pdf
6  The Opinion of the European Court of Justice on the EU-
Singapore Trade Agreement and the Division of Competences in 
Trade Policy Factsheet September 2017: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156035.pdf 
7  Scottish Government, Continuity Bill update (April 2019): 
https://news.gov.scot/news/continuity-bill-update
8  European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 12.
This is especially true with respect to the relationship 
between England and Scotland, for two reasons. First, 
a US trade negotiation would likely require changes 
to UK domestic legislation that Scotland, with its 
desire to maintain alignment with EU regulation, 
would oppose. Second, there is no overarching 
legal framework in place to preserve the UK internal 
market, and negotiations to achieve this have stalled.  
Thus a renewed effort is badly needed to establish 
effective collaboration between the administrations 
of the four nations, which includes at a minimum 
giving them a stronger role in trade negotiations, 
strengthening ongoing cooperation and providing 
legislative guarantees that environmental and 
consumer protections won’t be reduced if and when 
the UK leaves the EU. 
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
The Brexit process has highlighted the fragility of 
decision-making arrangements between the four 
nations. Unlike the EU, whose treaties and case 
law set out the rules and principles supporting 
the free movement of goods and services, there 
is no overarching legal or constitutional provision 
requiring an open internal UK market. Instead, there 
are complex arrangements in which some powers 
are exercised at the EU level and others are shared 
between the devolved nations and Westminster or the 
EU. The UK Parliament will not normally legislate on 
devolved matters without the consent of the devolved 
administrations, but this political convention is not 
legally binding. Ultimately the UK Parliament can 
legislate on any and all issues.3 
3  Scotland Act 2016, section 2; Wales Act 2017, section 2. 
See also R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, paras 136-151. As summarised in a House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper: ‘Although legislative consent has developed 
significantly since 1999, two key areas of contention have persisted: 
• the range of potential Bills that should be covered by the legislative 
consent process; and
• the circumstances in which … UK Parliament [can] legislate in the 
absence of devolved consent.
Disagreement on these issues has already had, and will likely 
continue to have, a significant impact on the relationship between 
the UK Government and the devolved authorities. In the context 
of key Brexit legislation, both of these questions are relevant, 
as two devolved legislatures intend, as things stand, to withhold 
legislative consent from at least two key Brexit Bills (the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill (2017-19) and the Trade Bill (2017-19).” 
Graeme Cowie, ‘Brexit: Devolution and legislative consent’, House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 08274 (29 March 2018), p 
11. 
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Understanding (or MoU) between the UK and 
the devolved administrations, which has been 
supplemented with separate concordats on 
international relations for each devolved nation. The 
MoU confirms that consultation with the devolved 
nations on trade negotiations will occur; however, it is 
clear that the MoU and its supplementary agreements 
do not constitute legally binding arrangements.13 
While the Constitutional Reform and Governance 
Act 2010 provides for limited scrutiny of treaties by 
Parliament, it does not require any involvement of the 
devolved administrations.14 A recent report by the 
House of Lord’s Constitution Committee recommends 
the devolved governments should be ‘effectively 
involved’ in treaty negotiations in order to ensure 
their competences are respected, proper reflection of 
their interests and in acknowledgement of their role in 
implementing international obligations.15
The Trade Bill introduced in November 2017 and 
the two Withdrawal Agreements had significant and 
differing impact on devolved powers, but these have 
now fallen with the dissolution of Parliament for 
the General Election.  If elected, the Conservatives 
suggest they would take forward the latest Withdrawal 
Agreement. This provides that Northern Ireland 
would remain aligned with EU law in many areas, 
including for example food safety law. How this will be 
implemented is unclear.16
13  Ibid p3; p5; A3.3; B1.2; B2.2; B3.2; D1.2; D2.2; D3.2. Para 14 
states: “The United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate 
on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament 
to decide what use to make of that power. However, the UK 
Government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the 
UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature.” 
D4.11 further states that “The UK Government will, under normal 
circumstances, not ask the UK Parliament to legislate in any area 
for which legislative competence has been devolved except with the 
agreement of the devolved legislature. But instances may arise, for 
reasons such as urgency, where full consultation and agreement is 
impractical.”
14  House of Commons Library, Parliament’s role in ratifying 
treaties: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/
Summary/SN05855
15  Select Committee on the Constitution, Parliamentary scrutiny of 
treaties (House of Lords April 2019) HL Paper 345, para 141.
16 General election 2019: Johnson ‘misrepresenting’ Brexit 
deal, says Corbyn (06.12.19) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
election-2019-50684881
nations. For example, our recent analysis of post-
Brexit food safety legislation showed that regulatory 
processes undertaken at the EU level, such as 
approving new active substances for pesticides and 
new GMOs will, post-Brexit, be done by devolved 
nations.9 This suggests that, rather than uniformity, 
the UK Government is gearing up for increased 
domestic regulatory divergence. It is unclear how 
the UK will prevent the need for internal regulatory 
checks and border barriers. For example, EU rules 
would have prevented a Member State from approving 
chlorinated chicken, or pesticides or GMOs that were 
banned at the EU level; in the new UK legislation, 
those controls have been removed at the national 
level. 
Unfortunately, conversations between the devolved 
nations aiming to prevent these types of problems 
have stalled. In principle, the UK Government and 
devolved administrations agreed in October 2017 
that it will be necessary to establish UK-wide 
‘common frameworks’.10 The UK Government’s latest 
assessment identifies 160 areas where common 
frameworks may be required.11 However, it is well 
known that there have been significant disagreements 
between the UK Government and the Scottish 
Government on the direction of travel in the Brexit 
process.
Those disagreements are currently simmering, but 
a US trade negotiation could ultimately act as the 
dynamite to blow the UK internal market – and 
potentially even the UK itself – apart. The reason 
for this is that a successful trade negotiation would 
likely require changes to UK domestic legislation 
in very sensitive areas, including drug pricing and 
food safety regulation, which Scotland, with its large 
Remain-voting majority and stated desire to maintain 
alignment with EU regulation, would strenuously 
oppose.12  EU departure creates a legal and policy 
vacuum. 
A role for the devolved nations is not provided 
for in the negotiation or scrutiny of international 
trade agreements. There is a Memorandum of 
9  UKTPO Briefing Paper 37 ‘Brexit food safety legislation and 
potential implications for UK trade: The devil in the details’:  http://
blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2019/10/UKTPO-Briefing-Paper-37.
pdf 
10  Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) Communique 
(16 October 2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/652285/Joint_Ministerial_Committee_communique.pdf
11  Cabinet Office, Revised frameworks analysis: breakdown of areas 
of EU law that intersect with devolved competence in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland (April 2019) https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/792738/20190404-FrameworksAnalysis.pdf
12  Jeremy Corbyn reveals dossier ‘proving NHS up for sale’, The Guardian 
(27 Nov 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/nov/27/
jeremy-corbyn-reveals-dossier-proving-nhs-up-for-sale
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In the context of this uncertainty, a US trade 
negotiation risks at least two potential undesirable 
outcomes. 
• The first is that the UK Government manages 
the different positions between Scotland and 
England by allowing Scotland to, effectively, 
ignore concessions made by the rest of the UK 
and maintain EU alignment. In other words, after 
complex negotiations within the UK concerning 
the border between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain, we would encounter a sequel: similar 
disputes between the UK and Scotland. 
• The second is that the central UK Westminster 
Government concludes a trade deal with the 
US, which it imposes on Scotland, fuelling the 
campaign for Scottish Independence. 
THE UK’S ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
The interesting thing about what we describe above 
as a ‘vacuum’ in terms of devolution arrangements 
is that there is an existing model in place namely: 
the EU. Over time, the EU has evolved a multi-level 
governance framework to enable the functioning of its 
fully-integrated Single Market. The EU possesses the 
powers conferred upon it by the treaties agreed by the 
Member States in legally-framed processes that are 
democratic and subject to scrutiny. Some powers are 
deemed ‘exclusive’ to the EU (eg the Customs Union 
or the negotiation of international trade agreements); 
in some areas there is ‘shared competence’ 
between the EU and Member States (eg regulation 
of the internal market, environment, agriculture and 
fisheries). 
Clearly, the most straightforward path for the UK 
outside the EU would be, as far as possible, to 
replicate that balance between devolution and 
harmonisation with respect to UK-specific rules and 
bodies. The fact that this has not been accomplished 
reveals the lack of trust and diverging objectives 
between devolved nations, in particular between 
England and Scotland. The differences in popular 
support for the EU between the nations makes 
cooperation especially difficult. Together with the 
absence of a functioning executive in Northern 
Ireland, a straightforward ‘solution’ to the relations 
amongst the UK nations is not forthcoming. However, 
if the UK Government wants to make continued 
cohesion of the UK more likely, there are several 
actions that it could take to enhance trust. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The most important way of ensuring a unified UK is 
to give devolved nations a strong and formal role 
in UK trade negotiations. The authors of this paper 
are not economists, but surely the destruction of 
the UK’s own internal market is a high price to pay 
for a UK-US trade agreement. Devolved nations 
should, therefore, have a formal role in the setting 
of UK negotiating objectives, for the very pragmatic 
reason of ensuring that external trade agreements 
do not lead to internal trade barriers. The political 
question of whether a UK-US trade agreement 
merits the dissolution of the Union is one that 
should be explicitly addressed.
Secondly, current arrangements for collaboration 
between the four UK nations are well-recognised 
to be ineffective and underdeveloped. The Joint 
Ministerial Committee (JMC), established under 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
the UK Government and devolved administrations 
in 2013, provides for the ‘central coordination’ 
of reserved and devolved responsibilities.17 The 
Westminster government must strengthen the JMC 
process or establish a more effective model, to 
ensure closer and more effective cooperation on 
regulatory issues.
Finally, to address Scotland’s desire to maintain 
alignment with the EU law, the UK Government 
could provide legal assurances that it will not lower 
standards below those of the EU, for example in 
consumer and environmental protection. There 
are a number of legislative contexts in which such 
commitments could be introduced, including the 
Environment Bill, the Agriculture Bill and the Trade 
Bill. Putting such commitments on a legislative 
footing would allow for proper parliamentary 
process on new policies and provide more legal 
certainty in these areas.
The UK Government may be forced to choose 
between facilitating trade with the US or holding on 
to the UK’s fragile national coherence. The above 
reforms are likely to be necessary conditions for 
ensuring the UK’s continued coherence – but they 
may not be sufficient.
17  Devolution Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary 
Agreements (October 2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/devolution-memorandum-of-understanding-and-
supplementary-agreement
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